Seeing Through the Weights:
Privacy Leakage in Scene Coordinate Regression

Oleksii Nasypanyi1,*, Jaemin Cho1,*, Utku Ozbulak2,3, Byungkon Kang4, Francois Rameau4,†

*Equal contribution    † Corresponding author

1Stony Brook University, 2Ghent University Global Campus, 3George Mason University Korea, 4SUNY Korea

ECCV 2026 (Long Oral)

oleksii.nasypanyi@stonybrook.edu jaemin.cho@stonybrook.edu francois.rameau@sunykorea.ac.kr

Abstract

Scene Coordinate Regression (SCR) methods are increasingly adopted for visual localization. In these approaches, the scene is implicitly encoded within a neural network that regresses a 3D world coordinate for each image pixel. Because the scene is represented only through the network parameters and not stored explicitly as images or maps, such methods are often assumed to be privacy-preserving. In this work, we show that this assumption is incorrect in practice.

We introduce a query-based attack that reconstructs the 3D geometry of the training environment from an SCR model under different levels of model access. We repeatedly query the model with batches of proxy images unrelated to the target scene to obtain dense pixel-wise 3D coordinates. Reliable points are identified through their stability under small input perturbations and can be further refined in a white-box setting. These stable points are accumulated across independent query batches to recover scene geometry. From the recovered 3D representation, we also invert network features to synthesize images from arbitrary viewpoints, revealing additional appearance information.

Experiments on indoor and outdoor datasets demonstrate that substantial portions of training environments can be reconstructed with high geometric fidelity. Beyond geometry, we recover approximate color appearance, exposing recognizable layout and potentially sensitive scene elements.

Scenario

Gray-box deployment scenario showing client-side feature extraction, the remotely hosted scene-specific regression head, and adversarial query access.
Gray-box deployment scenario. Feature extraction runs on the client using a public encoder, while the scene-specific head is hosted remotely. The client transmits spatially shuffled feature maps to the server, which returns predicted 3D scene coordinates for local pose estimation.

Method Overview

Pipeline diagram of the white-box attack on SCR models.
The attack queries a public encoder with proxy images, refines stable features, filters unreliable predictions, accumulates consistent 3D coordinates in a voxel grid, and inverts recovered features into novel views.

Qualitative Comparison

Private Scene
Recovered Scene

For quantitative results and further details, please refer to the paper.

BibTeX

@article{nasypanyi2026seeing,
  title={Seeing Through the Weights: Privacy Leakage in Scene Coordinate Regression},
}